Publication

Under Construction – November 2026

Nov 19, 2026

As 2026 comes to a close, the construction industry continues to adapt to new statutes, recent case law, and ongoing questions about how best to document the parties’ agreements. This issue of Under Construction highlights developments that share a common theme: clarity and certainty remain valuable tools for managing project risk.

In Colorado, House Bill 26-1311 took effect on August 12, 2026. On private projects, contractors and subcontractors may now replace cash retainage with a surety bond, and the owner or upstream contractor must accept a compliant bond and release the corresponding cash. On a $10 million job with 5% retainage, this could free up as much as $500,000 before closeout. The bonding option also extends to subcontractors, while contract terms addressing backcharges, setoffs and pay-if-paid conditions remain in place.

This issue also considers the tendency to overdraft complex construction agreements. Parties understandably try to address every foreseeable risk through additional provisions, but the added length can sometimes create ambiguity, which is a common source of construction disputes. As the article suggests, clarity and protection can work together, and clear language tends to leave less room for competing interpretations.

In California, Senate Bill 440 adds Civil Code § 8850 for private works contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2026. The new statute establishes timelines for reviewing claims, paying undisputed amounts, holding meet-and-confer conferences and proceeding to mediation. Unlike Civil Code § 8800, it does not include a good faith exception. As a result, disputed change-order amounts later found to be owed accrue interest at two percent per month, even where an owner disputed them in good faith. Owners may wish to review their claim-handling practices with this in mind.

Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Schuster v. Milbrath offers a helpful reminder about the importance of complete contract documents. The Court affirmed that two presale new construction contracts were unenforceable because the plans and specifications they referenced were never attached. Without that baseline, the selection clause could not fill the gap, and the parties’ conduct did not establish the missing mutual assent. For builders and developers, the decision underscores that a standard-form contract works best when the documents it incorporates are actually included.

Taken together, these developments point to a practical lesson: clearly drafted, complete agreements and careful attention to new statutory requirements can help parties avoid disputes and keep projects on track.

We hope you find these articles informative and enlightening. As always, we welcome your feedback and topic suggestions for future newsletters.

Best Regards,

Bond Your Retainage, Free Your Cash: Colorado Joins the Retainage-Bond States

The Bottom Line

Since August 12, 2026, a contractor or subcontractor on a private Colorado project can replace cash retainage with a surety bond, and the owner or upstream contractor must accept a compliant bond and release the cash. The change comes from House Bill 26-1311 (HB 26-1311). On a $10 million job with 5% retainage, that is up to $500,000 that no longer sits in an owner’s account until closeout.  Contractors should run the numbers on their next private job. Owners should update their contract forms now.

What a Retainage Bond Is

Retainage is the slice of each progress payment an owner holds back as security until the work is done. Colorado caps it at 5% on private work and on public contracts over $150,000. Retainage protects the owner, but it costs the contractor. The contractor has already paid for the labor and materials, and it must often finance the gap.

A retainage bond swaps that cash for a surety’s promise. Instead of withholding 5%, the owner pays the full progress payment and holds a bond in the same amount. If the contractor fails to finish the work or pay its subcontractors and suppliers, the owner or claimant looks to the surety.

A retainage bond is not a performance or payment bond. Those bonds usually cover the full contract price, and contractors post them at the start of the job. A retainage bond is smaller, and it replaces a specific pot of money. It also differs from a deposit of Treasury securities or certificates of deposit, which many states allow on public work. With securities, the owner still holds the contractor’s money. With a bond, the contractor gets its money back.

The New Colorado Rule for Private Projects

HB 26-1311 amends Colorado’s private retainage statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-46-101, -103. The governor signed it on May 7, 2026, and it took effect on August 12, 2026. According to the legislature’s fiscal note, it applies to construction contracts entered into on or after that date. Its core features are:

  • Acceptance is mandatory. A contractor or subcontractor may tender a retainage bond of up to 5% of the money it has earned. If the bond meets the statute, the owner, contractor, or subcontractor “shall accept” it and release the retainage the bond covers.
  • The bond must cover both performance and payment. It must be a surety bond from an insurer licensed in Colorado, conditioned on full performance of the contract and payment of all laborers, suppliers, and subcontractors.
  • Owners can set a rating floor, but only to a point. The owner or contractor may require a minimum A.M. Best financial strength rating, but it cannot require a rating higher than “A-.”
  • Bonding flows down. Once an owner accepts a bond from the general contractor, the contractor must accept a “like bond” from any subcontractor that offers one. A like bond is one substantially equivalent to the contractor’s own bond.
  • Premium costs can be passed through. When a contractor bonds off a subcontractor’s share of retainage, it may withhold that subcontractor’s portion of the premium.
  • Lien and bond claims follow the bond. The bond and its proceeds are subject to claims and liens in the same manner and with the same priority as under Colorado’s mechanics’ lien statute.

The statute does not apply to property that a public entity owns, including property held through public-private partnerships. It also leaves intact contract terms on payment timing, satisfactory performance, backcharges and setoffs, and pay-if-paid conditions.

Colorado Public Projects Still Use Securities, Not Bonds

HB 26-1311 does not change public work. On Colorado public contracts over $150,000, the public entity must pay at least 95% of the value of completed work. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-91-103. The contractor may withdraw retained funds by depositing “acceptable securities” whose market value at all times at least equals the amount withdrawn.  Id. § 24-91-105. Acceptable securities are U.S. bonds, Treasury notes, and Treasury bills; general obligation or revenue bonds of Colorado or its political subdivisions; and FDIC-insured certificates of deposit from banks and savings and loan associations with their principal office in Colorado. Id. § 24-91-102. A surety bond is not on the list.

The contractor keeps the interest and income on the securities. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-91-107. If the public entity determines that the securities have lost value, it gives notice, and the contractor must deposit more. When the contractor receives released retainage and interest, it must pass them through to each subcontractor that has performed, in proportion to what it held back from each. Id. § 24-91-109. This regime improves the return on retained funds, but it does not free up capital the way a bond does.

How Other States Compare

Other states fall into three broad groups. The differences matter for contractors working across state lines.

1. Must-accept bond states: Washington and Oregon

Colorado’s new law closely tracks Washington’s private-project statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 60.30.020, enacted in 2023 and amended in 2024. Like Colorado, Washington requires acceptance, caps the rating floor at A-, allows premium pass-through, and requires like bonds downstream. It goes further than Colorado in two ways. The contractor must release subcontractor retainage within 30 days after accepting a like bond, and the bond must also be conditioned on payment of the taxes, increases, and penalties incurred on the project. Washington’s statute does not apply to single-family residential construction of fewer than 12 units. On public work, Wash. Rev. Code § 60.28.011(6) requires the contractor to provide, and the public body to accept, a retainage bond within 30 days after a subcontractor requests one, unless the public body shows good cause, the bond is not commercially available, or the subcontractor refuses to pay its share of the premium and provide a like bond.

Oregon requires public agencies to accept a surety bond or approved securities in lieu of retainage. An agency may refuse only on a written finding of good cause based on unique project circumstances. Or. Rev. Stat. § 279C.560. A separate statute extends the bond rule to “large commercial structures,” which Oregon defines as structures that are neither residential structures nor small commercial structures. Id. §§ 701.005, .435. Under that statute, both the owner and “any lender” must accept the bond and release the matching retainage within 30 days. Oregon also prescribes the bond form by statute. The legislature amended both Oregon statutes in 2024.

2. Securities-substitution states

Many states, mostly on public work, let contractors swap cash for securities or escrowed investments rather than a bond. Arizona requires public owners, at the contractor’s option, to accept assigned certificates of deposit, government securities, and similar instruments in place of the statute’s 10% retention. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 34-221. At 50% completion, if progress is satisfactory, the contractor may request release of half the amount retained, and later progress payments are subject to no more than 5% retention. California requires public bids and contracts to permit substitution of securities, with a limited exception for certain federally financed contracts. If a public agency omits those provisions, its contract’s performance-retention provisions are void. Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 22300. Montana and Maryland offer similar securities or escrow options on public work. Wyoming requires a public entity, at the general contractor’s request, to enter an interest-bearing deposit agreement on contracts over $50,000. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-6-704.

3. Cap-and-release states

Other states regulate how much retainage owners may hold and how quickly they must release it, but the statutes we reviewed offer no bond alternative. Examples include North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah. In those states, a retainage bond is available only if the contract provides for it.

Practical Considerations

For contractors and subcontractors

  • Weigh the premium against the cash. A retainage bond costs a premium. Compare it with what the retained cash costs you, such as interest on a credit line or the return you would earn by putting it to work. On large or long jobs, freeing the cash will often outweigh the premium. On short jobs, it may not.
  • Watch your bonding capacity. A retainage bond uses part of your surety program. Talk with your broker before you tender one so it does not crowd out bid or performance bonds on future work.
  • Expect indemnity. Your surety will require the same indemnity it requires for other bonds. If the surety pays a claim, it will look to you for reimbursement.
  • Plan for flowdown. If you bond your own retainage, your subcontractors can demand the same treatment.  Decide in advance how you will collect premium shares and track like bonds.

For owners and developers

  • You cannot refuse a compliant bond. On Colorado private work, your discretion is limited to confirming that the bond meets the statute and, if you choose, requiring a minimum surety rating no higher than A-.
  • Your claim process changes. Instead of drawing on cash you hold, you must make a claim on the bond.  That process takes more time and paperwork. Build notice and claim procedures into your contract.
  • Check your lender documents. Construction loans often require the owner to hold retainage.  Unlike Oregon’s statute, Colorado’s does not address lenders. Coordinate with your lender before a contractor tenders the first bond.
  • Keep your other remedies. The statute preserves your contract rights to withhold for defective work, backcharges, and setoffs. Make sure your contract states them clearly.

How We Can Help

HB 26-1311 changes the economics of private Colorado projects, and contractors will tender the first retainage bonds on contracts entered into after August 12, 2026. Whether you are deciding whether to bond off your retainage, receiving a bond you must now accept, or juggling different rules across several states, the right contract language now will help prevent disputes at closeout.

Our construction team can review and update your owner, prime, and subcontract forms; set bond, surety-rating, claim, and release-timing terms; help coordinate with your lenders and sureties; and advise on retainage rules specific to Colorado, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, and other states where you work.

Stop Complicating Complex Construction Agreements by Overdrafting Them

Mark Twain famously concluded, after signing many contracts, that six months after signing them he was certain of two things: one, he did not sign any contract; and two, the contract meant the opposite of what it said.1 His first concern probably came from the surprise of realizing that there really was no meeting of the minds after scrupulous negotiation and apparent agreement on the written terms. The second concern must have something to do with how the contracting parties found completely opposite ways to interpret what was negotiated and written into a contract that the parties had freely executed.

About eight years ago, Shawn Burton, a Fortune 500 general counsel, was leading the cause for writing clearer, plain-language contracts when he shared his concerns that “[f]or the most part, the contracts used in business are long, poorly structured, and full of unnecessary and incomprehensible language.”2 Burton elaborated in the Harvard Business Review as follows:

Are pages of definitions; words like ‘heretofore,’ ‘indemnification,’ ‘warrant,’ and ‘force majeure’; and phrases like ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein’ . . . necessary for an agreement to be enforceable? The answer is that even for complex business contracting issues the basic language need not be obscure, opaque and unreadable.

Burton’s appeal for plain language fell mostly on deaf ears in the construction industry, despite simplified form agreements crafted by industry leaders like the American Institute of Architects (AIA) and ConsensusDocs, the latter presuming by its name, “Consensus,” that the industry found these contract forms acceptable as is. Instead, contracting parties developed an unfortunate habit of inserting every imaginable contingency and risk into lengthy additional paragraphs that confused the standardized contract provisions.

Granted, it is essential to define critical industry terms in construction contracts. But the cause for plain language has been hindered by worst-case litigation experiences and dispute resolution nightmares that contracting parties insist upon covering in their written agreements. They do this as though including such exhaustive language will prevent such worst-case nightmares from recurring on their projects.

Understandably vigilant and risk averse, the parties presumably add these one-sided specifics to make the contract safer. On the contrary, these contingencies and risks are already contemplated in the original, standard verbiage. And any chance for clarity from plain language is lost when standard contract documents become cluttered with wordy narratives intended for interpretation by a judge, jury, or arbitrator rather than for key players who especially need clarity in performing the contract on the project.

Also lost are more reasonable interpretations of the contract, and the risk of disputes probably increases. Litigation over subjective terms is made inevitable when parties rewrite and confuse the standardized provisions. Ambiguity is, after all, a leading source of construction litigation and arbitration.

Some argue that the construction industry trend is irreversible and that drafters must accept contract documents full of contingencies, risks, and anticipated liabilities, mixed in with the standard terms and conditions for the project. If so, however, drafters must also accept that courts will apply rules of construction, such as construing ambiguities against the drafter, and this can shift risk in ways the drafter never intended. Every unclear clause is an invitation for a tribunal, rather than the parties, to decide what the contract means.

Also consider that dense contract language is not merely an inconvenience. When standard industry terms are buried in a long paragraph, or split across the general conditions, supplementary conditions, and a specification section, a contractor’s valid claims may be lost on a technicality. Or an owner may face an argument that a strict requirement was waived through a course of dealing. Neither outcome reflects what the parties actually bargained for. Subcontractors and suppliers who cannot readily assess numerous risks will probably overprotect themselves by adding contingencies to their bids, or they may withdraw their bids entirely. Opaque risk allocation may, therefore, raise project costs and narrow the pool of competitive bidders.

Since the negotiation and drafting of complex construction agreements is bound to follow good and bad habits, all influenced by a fear of and resistance to plain language, the parties simply have to expect that drafting will take additional time, and the costs will be correspondingly much higher. Meanwhile, the debate will go on as to whether longer, wordier contracts lead to more or less litigation than shorter, plain-language contracts.

The most common objection to plain-language drafting — that it sacrifices legal protection — will probably endure. But the better view is that clarity and protection reinforce each other. In the end, drafters of construction contracts will at least find consistency in a tribunal prioritizing a determination of what the parties intended — looking first to the words they used. Clear words will always leave less room for competing interpretations, extrinsic evidence, or default rules of construction.

Mark Twain would probably agree that carefully organized plain language is better to ensure that the parties actually signed a contract and that the contracting parties are not left with completely opposite interpretations of what they signed.  

***Opinions expressed are those of the author and those quoted, and not necessarily the firm’s or their colleagues’.

Good Faith Is No Longer Free Under SB 440 and Civil Code § 8800

For as long as I have litigated California construction payment disputes, owners have enjoyed a reliable escape hatch. Civil Code § 8800 requires an owner to pay a progress payment within 30 days after the contractor demands it, but only if “there is no good faith dispute” about the payment.3 If a dispute exists, the owner may withhold up to 150 percent of the disputed amount, and the 2 percent monthly penalty applies only to amounts “wrongfully withheld.”4 Translation: if you could articulate a reason, you could keep the money and argue about it later. For contractors, that usually meant working now and fighting later.

Senate Bill 440 does not repeal that escape hatch. It does something more interesting: it charges admission at 24 percent a year on change-order money an owner wrongly disputes.

What SB 440 Actually Does SB 440, the Private Works Change Order Fair Payment Act (the “Act”), passed both houses unanimously, and the governor signed it in October 2025.5 The Act adds Civil Code § 8850 and applies to private works contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2026. It excludes residential projects that are not mixed use and do not exceed four stories. Unless the Legislature extends it, the Act will sunset on January 1, 2030.

The Act borrows from the public works claims process in Public Contract Code § 9204, but with shorter deadlines and higher stakes for owners. The Act defines a “claim” as a separate demand for more time, for payment for work the contract does not otherwise cover, or for payment of a disputed amount. The contractor must send the claim by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The owner has 30 days to review the claim and tell the contractor, in writing, which parts it disputes. The owner must pay any undisputed portion within 60 days after that. If the contractor disagrees, it can demand a meet-and-confer conference. The owner must schedule the conference within 30 days and then issue a revised written statement within 10 business days after it occurs. Anything still in dispute goes to nonbinding mediation, with the parties splitting the cost. If they cannot agree on a mediator within 10 business days, the contractor picks one. An owner that ignores a claim does not win by default. The statute treats silence as a denial, sending the contractor straight to the conference and mediation. Do not bother trying to contract around any of this in advance — the Act declares a waiver of its rights “void and contrary to public policy.”

Where the Two Statutes Collide

Here is where the two statutes part ways. Section 8800 rewards good faith; the Act ignores it. Under the Act, disputed amounts that are “later found to be owed” bear interest at two percent per month, starting from the date they would have been due absent the dispute. There is no exception for good faith. An owner that honestly rejects a change order and turns out to be wrong pays the same rate as one that rejected it just to hold onto the money. Under § 8800, by contrast, a good faith dispute avoids the penalty altogether.6

The numbers add up quickly. Suppose that, midway through a mixed-use project, the owner directs the contractor to upgrade the lobby finishes to satisfy a new tenant. The contractor submits a $750,000 change-order claim. The owner rejects it in good faith, believing the upgrade falls within the contract’s allowance for finish selections. Eighteen months later, with the building still under construction, a trier of fact disagrees and awards the full amount. Under the Act, the owner now owes about $270,000 in interest on top of the $750,000 for the upgraded lobby finishes. By contrast, ordinary prejudgment interest under Civil Code § 3287 generally would not reach an unliquidated claim like this. Owners will likely argue that the Legislature could not possibly have intended that result. Contractors will likely respond that the Legislature knows how to write a good faith exception and chose not to.

The statutes also part ways when it comes to attorney’s fees. Section 8800 awards costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action to collect wrongfully withheld progress payments.7 The Act has no fee provision. Contractors get the better interest rate under the Act and fee recovery under § 8800, but not necessarily both for the same dollar.

Stop-work rights also differ between the statutes. Civil Code § 8832 lets a contractor stop work for nonpayment only when there is no dispute about its performance. The Act is more generous. A contractor may suspend work without penalty when “payment is due” or a claim is deemed denied, so long as it first sends a notice and then, 30 days later, a 10-day notice of intent to stop work. During the amendment process, the Legislature deleted a reference to “undisputed amounts due,” which gives contractors an argument that the right reaches disputed sums too.8 Owners will undoubtedly disagree, and the courts will eventually decide who is right.

What This Means on the Jobsite

For contractors, the Act finally rewards the paperwork you have always meant to do (and that your attorneys keep bothering you about). Send claims by certified or registered mail; an email, even an emphatic one, may not count. Be specific so that you do not open the door to an owner arguing that the 30-day clock never started. The Act sets no deadline for submitting a claim, so your contract’s notice provisions still control, and they remain as unforgiving as ever. Talk to your attorneys about running progress billings under § 8800 and change-order claims under the Act on parallel tracks to get the most out of each statute. And before you stop work over a disputed amount, remember that no court has yet tested the stop-work provision.

The Act also gives subcontractors a new way to reach the owner. Because subcontractors usually have no contract with the owner, a subcontractor can ask the direct contractor, in writing, to submit its claim on the subcontractor’s behalf. The direct contractor must then present the claim to the owner, tell the subcontractor within 30 days whether it did so (and, if not, why), and pursue the claim in good faith. The direct contractor cannot settle the claim without the subcontractor’s written approval. Talk to your attorneys about building these procedures into your subcontracts now, before they become an issue.

For owners and developers, saying no now comes with a price tag. Work with your attorneys to calendar every claim on arrival, separate the disputed from the undisputed amounts, and pay the undisputed portion on time. If the merits are close, discuss your options with your attorneys and use the tools the Act gives you.

Finally, have your attorneys check your contract forms. The Act applies to contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2026, and new task orders under an old master agreement may bring a project within its reach. Owner forms designed to push every dispute to closeout may not survive a statute that makes waivers void.

The Bottom Line

Section 8800 asks whether the owner had a good reason to withhold payment; the Act asks whether the owner was right. For change orders, only the second question matters now. Owners who adapt will find the process manageable. Those who do not will learn that good faith, while admirable, now accrues interest at 24 percent a year.

Idaho Supreme Court Holds Presale Custom Construction Contracts Unenforceable Where Baseline Plans and Specifications Were Never Attached

On September 24, 2026, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Schuster v. Milbrath, affirming the Bonner County district court’s ruling that two presale new construction purchase and sale agreements were invalid and unenforceable. 597 P.3d 541 (Idaho 2026). The opinion resolves several issues central to presale condominium and residential sales, including whether the grade and type of finish materials are material terms, whether a contract’s selection clause can supply terms the parties never agreed on, and whether a builder’s conduct can create an agreement the contract itself lacks. For builders and developers selling projects before construction, the decision is a clear warning that a standard-form contract is only as enforceable as the attachments it incorporates.

Background

In 2020 and 2021, Benjamin Milbrath began developing single-family and duplex-style condominiums in the Harrison Heights subdivision in Schweitzer Village. Ryan Schuster signed purchase and sale agreements (“PSAs”) for two units, and Milbrath entered into similar PSAs with other buyers. Each PSA used the Idaho Association of Realtors’ 2019 Form RE-22, “Pre-Sold New Construction.” One provision required Milbrath to build “in accordance with” the base Model 185-D design. Another provision stated that the buyer was “purchasing a custom built residence not based on a model, but on detailed Plans and Specifications,” which were “attached and incorporated herein by reference.” A third provision stated that the plans and specifications contained the “grade and type of materials used in finishing the residence or a dollar allowance for such items” with the cost “included in the purchase price.” Yet none of the PSAs attached any plans or specifications.

After COVID-19 supply-chain disruptions drove up construction costs, the parties disputed whether Milbrath had demanded a price increase and whether the contract price covered basic or upgraded finishes. The buyers sued Milbrath for breach of contract and sought specific performance requiring him to build and sell the units at the contract prices. After a bench trial, the district court held that the PSAs for Schuster’s two units were invalid and unenforceable, and Schuster appealed.

Key Holdings

The decision addresses issues that directly affect builders and developers using presale contracts, including which terms are essential in a contract to build and sell a home, whether a contract can supply missing terms on its own, and how the parties’ conduct bears on whether they formed a contract.

First, the scope of work is a material term in a contract to build and sell a home. An ordinary land sale contract needs only the parties, the subject matter, the price, a property description, and any other essential terms. But because these PSAs obligated Milbrath to build customizable units, the Court applied the rule that “[t]he scope of the work to be performed is a material term of a construction contract.” The PSAs called for construction based on the base Model 185-D design, yet also described a custom home built to detailed plans and specifications. Those plans and specifications would have allowed the parties to modify the subject matter by selecting different grades and types of finish materials and dollar allowances through a change order process. Without them, the PSAs alone did not establish what portion of the purchase price covered builder-grade finishes, high-end custom finishes, or something in between.

Second, the contract’s selection clause could not fill the gap. That clause asks the buyer to choose colors and materials at the seller’s request and lets the seller choose if the buyer does not respond. The Court found that the clause depends entirely on the missing plans and specifications. Without a baseline in those documents, the selection clause fails to identify which finishing materials the purchase price includes and which materials cost extra, whether an allowance applies, or what standard governs the buyer’s selections. Nothing in the PSAs gave the Court a way to determine the missing terms.

Third, the parties’ conduct did not supply the missing mutual assent. The meeting-of-the-minds inquiry is objective, and “[i]t is not enough that the parties think that they have made a contract.” Schuster insisted the price covered the highest trim levels, while Milbrath expected to settle finish materials as construction progressed. Milbrath’s February 2022 letters, which proposed a base model for the first time and offered to amend the PSAs, confirmed that the parties had not settled the finishes, and Schuster’s rejection of the letters established that the parties never shared a common understanding of the finishes.

Fourth, the PSAs were incomplete, not merely ambiguous. Schuster argued that the conflict between the model-based and custom-home provisions was an ambiguity the trial court could resolve. But a contract is ambiguous only when its words support more than one reasonable reading. Whichever provision controlled, the PSAs lacked essential terms on finish materials, so the Court had nothing to interpret. The Court also rejected the argument that its ruling makes the RE-22 form useless for presale construction, explaining that the form works when the parties complete it as intended.

Fifth, because no enforceable contract existed, Schuster’s remaining challenges failed. His objection to the additional $195,000 bond required to stay the sale of the units pending the appeal became moot. The Court also upheld Milbrath’s attorney-fee award and awarded him fees on appeal.

Practical Takeaways

  • Builders using the RE-22 form should complete it as intended. If the buyer is purchasing a custom-built home rather than a base model, the builder should attach the required plans and specifications and clearly define the change order process.
  • A model name, conceptual rendering, or floor plan alone does not define the scope of work for a customizable unit. Before signing, the parties should confirm that the plans and specifications state the grade and type of finishes or a dollar allowance.
  • Selection and change-order clauses work only when the plans and specifications establish a baseline to adjust from. Selections and change orders cannot replace specifications that no one created.

This decision gives Idaho builders and developers clear direction on what a presale construction contract must contain to be enforceable. As construction costs remain volatile, a well-defined scope of work protects both builder and buyer. Builders selling units before construction should confirm that their agreements attach complete plans, specifications, or finish allowances before accepting offers.

Footnotes

  1. See Mark Twain, Mark Twain’s Notebook 39 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., Harper & Bros. 1935).

  2. Kate Vitasek, Plain Language Contracts on the Rise, Forbes (Mar. 23, 2018), [URL] (citing Shawn Burton, The Case for Plain-Language Contracts, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at [page]).

  3. Cal. Civ. Code § 8800(a) (West 2025).

  4. Id. § 8800(b)-(c).

  5. S.B. 440, 2025-2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025) (enacted as ch. 583) (adding Cal. Civ. Code § 8850(n), (o)); see also Legis. Counsel’s Dig., S.B. 440, 2025–2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025).

  6. Cal. Civ. Code § 8800(b)-(c).

  7. Id. § 8800(c).

  8. See S.B. 440, 2025–2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025) (adding Cal. Civ. Code § 8850(k)).

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