Arizona Court of Appeals Affirms Denial of Public Records Request for Cast Vote Records

By Joseph Kanefield and Eric Spencer¹

Public confidence in the integrity, accuracy, and fairness of the electoral process depends in part on the ability of citizens to access, audit, and verify election-related data.

Arizona, however, imposes restrictions designed to protect the secrecy of the ballot and the security of election materials. The election statutes require election officials to safeguard both physical ballots and electronic ballot data from unauthorized access, copying, or transfer. These provisions reflect the Legislature’s judgment that ballot security is essential to preserving voter confidence and preventing tampering — even after an election has been canvassed and certified.

The tension between these two values — open government and ballot security — is at the heart of the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Hudson v. Heap. The opinion clarifies that specific non-disclosure mandates set forth in law override the general presumption of public access, even after an election has concluded, and that prior voluntary disclosures of such protected records do not waive the statutory protections going forward.

In this case, the plaintiff requested the Maricopa County Elections Department produce the electronic records of voters’ ballot selections generated during the 2024 election cycle, known as the Cast Vote Records. The County denied the request, concluding that A.R.S. § 16-625 required election officials to protect electronic ballot data from access or copying. The Maricopa County Superior Court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s special action complaint.

The Court of Appeals held that Cast Vote Records indeed constitute “electronic data from . . . ballots” under A.R.S. § 16-625. Applying ordinary dictionary definitions, the court found that the Cast Vote Records — which include information derived from scanned ballots — fall squarely within the statute’s protective mandate. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the statute applies only during ongoing election contests, noting that A.R.S. § 16-624 imposes post-election canvass security obligations for paper ballots and § 16-625 requires protections for electronic data that are “at least as protective” as those for paper ballots.

Hudson confirms that Arizona counties may deny public records requests for any electronic data derived from ballots — including Cast Vote Records — regardless of whether the underlying election has concluded. Government entities and requestors should be aware that these protections are permanent and are not extinguished by a prior voluntary disclosure by an election official.