Semaan v. Mosier: California Court of Appeal Affirms Immunity for Receiver’s Discretionary Acts

By: Clifford S. Davidson, Marshall J. Hogan, and Amit D. Ranade
 
The California Court of Appeal has held that court-appointed receivers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts. Previous decisions suggested such protection for receivers, but a recent Court of Appeal decision directly insulates them from liability for their discretionary acts — protecting them from many, if not most, potential claims. This decision may increase the willingness of qualified practitioners to act as receivers and bolster receiverships as a tool for creditors.
 
In its opinion in Semaan v. Mosier, the California Court of Appeal (Fourth District — Division Three), filed February 5, 2026, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order granting an anti-SLAPP motion in favor of Robert P. Mosier, a court-appointed receiver in a criminal insurance fraud prosecution against Simon Semaan. The anti-SLAPP statute allows defendants sued based on speech or petition conduct to file what is essentially an early summary judgment motion and, if that motion is granted, to recover attorney fees from the plaintiff. Because states such as Oregon and Washington often look to California anti-SLAPP decisions in construing their respective anti-SLAPP statutes, the Semaan decision likely will be persuasive elsewhere.
 
The case arose from a criminal insurance fraud case initiated in 2021 against Simon Semaan. To preserve assets, the Criminal Court issued a temporary restraining order and appointed Mosier as receiver. The Court also ordered him to liquidate all stock holdings into cash “as soon as practicable.”
 
Approximately six weeks later, he had not yet liquidated the stocks due in part to certain supposed “non-standard” requirements of the investment firm Mosier claimed would subject him to unwanted tax consequences. He also delayed liquidating the accounts because he was engaged in settlement negotiations that, if successful, likely would have required him to reverse any liquidation of the accounts.
 
Members of the Semaan family claimed Mosier’s failure to liquidate the stocks resulted in damages of approximately $1.2 million. When Mosier was relieved of his role as receiver in 2022, they sued Mosier civilly (after seeking permission from the criminal court) to recover damages for his alleged breach of fiduciary duty. They sought damages for the reduction in stock value between when Mosier was ordered to liquidate shares and the time he was relieved as receiver. Mosier answered the complaint and filed an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking dismissal of the action.
 
The Trial Court granted Mosier’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Plaintiffs’ claims targeted Mosier’s conduct during his appointment as receiver, which was protected. The court also held Plaintiffs’ claims lacked the requisite minimum merit because, in part, Mosier’s acts were protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiffs appealed.
 
The Appellate Court agreed that the Plaintiffs’ claims arose from protected activity under the “catchall” provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(e)(4), which protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition…in connection with…an issue of public interest.” As Mosier was the court-appointed receiver in one of the largest workers’ compensation fraud prosecutions in California history, the Appellate Court held, Mosier’s acts were protected because they were in furtherance of that prosecution and its effect on the public.¹
 
On the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis (which requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim have “minimal merit”), the Court observed that “[n]o California state court has squarely decided whether court-appointed receivers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.” The Court reviewed state and federal courts touching upon this question and concluded it “agree[d] that court-appointed receivers should enjoy quasi-judicial immunity” for their discretionary acts. Echoing the reasoning of other courts, the Appellate Court held that receivers are arms of the court. As such, the Court held, their function is integral to the judicial process, without immunity, qualified individuals would be reluctant to accept receivership appointments and their decision making could be distorted by fear of litigation. The Court clarified, however, that quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to ministerial acts or intentional misconduct such as self-dealing.
 
Applying this framework, the Court concluded that Mosier’s decision about when to liquidate the accounts — guided by the order’s “as soon as practicable” language, ongoing settlement negotiations, and issues with the investment firm — was quintessentially discretionary, and thus immune from suit regardless of whether his judgment was ultimately correct.
 
This opinion provides a powerful defense tool for receivers because it represents the first opinion by a California appellate court squarely affirming that court-appointed receivers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for their discretionary acts while discharging their receivership duties. Until now, receivers have had to rely on federal authority, or authority strongly suggesting that receivers enjoy immunity but that did not squarely address the issue. As described by the Semaan court, the immunity applies whether the decision ultimately proves right or wrong; the Court emphasized that quasi-judicial immunity protects both good and bad judgment calls to ensure qualified individuals will accept appointments without fear of litigation.
 
In contrast to California, a receiver’s immunity and liability in Washington and Oregon proceedings are governed by statute.
 
Statutes in both states impose personal liability to debtors for damage caused by: (i) a receiver’s failure to comply with a court order; or (ii) an act or omission for which a corporate director would be liable under the state’s corporations act. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.170(1)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 37.300(1). Both statutes impose liability to third parties for damages caused by fraud, intentional torts, or acts for which a corporate director would be liable. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.170(2); Or. Rev. Stat. § 37.300(2).²
 
Statutes in both states grant immunity for acts contemplated or permitted by court order.  See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.170(3); Or. Rev. Stat. § 37.300(3). Washington’s statute specifically immunizes receivers from third party claims arising from the receiver’s performance of their duties and operation of businesses in receivership. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.170(2.)