Publication
Meta Prevails in FTC Antitrust Litigation
In a closely watched antitrust decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Meta Platforms Inc. (Meta) in FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., following a six-week bench trial. The court held that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) failed to prove that Meta had current monopoly power in the relevant market — a broader social media market that now includes TikTok and YouTube.1 The district court’s opinion underscores the centrality of market definition in § 2 Sherman Act claims, the ever-evolving substitution of apps in rapidly evolving attention markets, and the FTC’s forward-looking burden under § 13(b) of the FTC Act, which may make antitrust enforcement more difficult as the technological landscape continues to evolve at a breakneck pace driven by artificial intelligence (AI).
I. The FTC’s Sherman Act Claim and Narrow Market Definition
The FTC initiated its antitrust suit in 2020 against Meta (formerly Facebook) under § 2 of the Sherman Act,2 alleging that Meta held monopoly power in a market for personal social networking (PSN) services and unlawfully maintained that power through the acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014. The FTC argued that Meta’s dominance in the PSN services marketplace was preserved, not by competition on the merits, but by the acquisition of nascent rivals. Section 2 of the Sherman act prohibits monopolization of trade or commerce.3 However, monopolies in and of themselves do not constitute an offense of monopolization under the Sherman Act. Monopolization requires (1) holding monopoly power in a defined market and (2) acquiring or maintaining that power through anticompetitive conduct, rather than outcompeting rivals in that marketplace.4 The market definition used by the court in antitrust lawsuits is generally outcome-determinative.5
The FTC alleged that Meta’s conduct in the PSN services marketplace amounted to monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act and sought injunctive relief under § 13(b) of the FTC Act.6 The FTC defined the relevant market narrowly in its argument, including only Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and MeWe — while excluding TikTok and YouTube as distinct “entertainment” platforms.7 Meta countered the FTC’s allegations, arguing the boundaries between social networking and media apps have eroded, and that TikTok and YouTube are direct competitors for user attention.8
II. Market Definition Expands Five Years Later
The court conducted an analysis to define the relevant market, applying the hypothetical monopolist test and qualitative factors from Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.9 The court concluded that the relevant product market was not limited to PSN services but a broader social media market that now includes both TikTok and YouTube.
The court based its analysis on three key points. First, natural experiments like app outages and TikTok bans in certain countries demonstrated that users readily substituted their time among Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube interchangeably. When Meta’s apps (i.e., Facebook and Instagram) were unavailable, users migrated to TikTok or YouTube and vice versa.10 Second, the dominant features of Meta’s apps — short-form, AI-recommended video content — are virtually indistinguishable from TikTok and YouTube Shorts.11 Content creators post identical videos across all platforms, and each company deliberately copies one another. Third, internal documents, industry expert reports, and executive testimony confirmed that these four apps are viewed as direct competitors. For example, Meta has made billions of dollars in investment decisions on product development because it views TikTok and YouTube as serious competitive threats.12 However, the court conceded that “PSN apps may have been a market unto themselves when the FTC filed this case in 2020 or when it approved [Meta’s] acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp,” but “[t]hat is no longer the case.”13
III. TikTok’s Explosive Growth Undermines the FTC’s Monopolization Claim
With the relevant market defined to include TikTok and YouTube, the total time spent by U.S. users on social media platforms fell below well-established legal thresholds for present monopoly power. The court found that Meta’s share of user time spent in the broader social media network — based on the latest data from 2025 — was below the 70%–80% of the market share typically required to infer monopoly power.14 TikTok’s inclusion alone defeated the FTC’s monopolization claim because of its heightened share within the social media market.15 The court found that Meta’s share of the relevant market share has been eroding ever since TikTok broke into the market in 2018, and that Meta had failed to maintain market dominance that may have previously existed.16 Because § 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes only forward-looking relief, the FTC had to prove a present or imminent violation in 2025 but failed to do so.17
IV. Three Key Takeaways
The Meta court’s decision provides three insightful takeaways in today’s dynamic, AI-driven markets. First, market definition in digital ecosystems is moving to where the users actually are rather than overly static labels. Real-world substitution — i.e., what app users open next and for how long — carries more weight than labels assigned by companies or government agencies. Second, time is the currency for apps in the attention-driven marketplaces. For ad-supported apps that are free for users, time spent on the apps is the best proxy for both market share and monetization. Greater emphasis on up-to-date data on monthly users will be required by both enforcers and defendants in antitrust actions. Finally, the enforcement statute matters more than ever. Forward‑looking relief under § 13(b) requires proof of a present or imminent violation, which can be difficult in fast‑moving markets. Agencies may focus comparatively more on merger enforcement under § 7 of the Clayton Act — in which the inquiry is predictive — though outcomes will still remain fact‑specific.
Snell & Wilmer’s Special Litigation and Compliance group is closely monitoring these developments and practical implications for product strategy, M&A dealmaking, and litigation risk. We will continue to track the Meta litigation and related enforcement initiatives.
Footnotes
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FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., at 2–3, 77, 82–86 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2025) (mem. op.).
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FTC v. Facebook, Inc. (Facebook I), 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2021).
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15 U.S.C. § 2.
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United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992).
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Facebook I, 560 F. Supp. 3d. at 11.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 36–37.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 37.
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370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962).
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 41–55.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 14–15.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 54.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 40–41.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 86 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (“it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent [market share] would be enough [for monopoly power].”)).
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 88.
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Meta, No. 1:20-cv-03590, at 87.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (requiring an entity to be “violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the [FTC]”).
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