DOJ Unveils Uniform Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policy

By James P. Melendres, Joseph G. Adams, Andrew P. Young, Jason Spitalnick, Sam Crockett Neel, Taryn J. Gallup, and Kourtney E. George

On March 10, 2026, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche announced the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ” or the “Department”) release of a “first-ever Department-wide” Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP), which will apply to all corporate criminal matters handled by the Department (except for those relating to antitrust under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38).¹

The new Department-wide CEP offers additional incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate with DOJ investigations, and remediate in corporate criminal matters. According to the DOJ, because the CEP applies to all corporate criminal cases across the Department, it will provide greater “predictability” for companies considering these issues.²

The CEP’s three-tiered framework, which ties outcomes to a company’s disclosure, cooperation, and remediation, is outlined below.

1. Part I – Full Declinations Are Available When a Company Meets Certain Factors

Companies that voluntarily and promptly self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate, and timely remediate are eligible for a declination, absent significant aggravating factors (e.g., egregious conduct, substantial harm, or recidivism). Self-disclosure must involve misconduct previously unknown to the Department, that the company had no prior obligation to disclose, and that was unlikely to be discovered otherwise. Importantly, a company is eligible for a declination even where a whistleblower first makes a submission to DOJ, if the company: (a) self-reports within 120 days after receiving an internal whistleblower report, and (b) satisfies the other requirements for a declination.

Notably, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination even when aggravating factors exist — such as egregious or pervasive misconduct, significant harm to victims, or recent recidivism — where the company’s cooperation and remediation are sufficiently robust.

Finally, a declination is not without consequence: companies must still pay all disgorgement/forfeiture, as well as restitution, and/or victim compensation. Additionally, the Department will publicly disclose the declination.

2. Part II – Companies May Still Avoid Prosecution if They Fall Under the “Near Miss” Category

Companies that fall short of declination eligibility, whether due to delayed disclosure, the presence of aggravating circumstances, or other deficiencies, but nonetheless provide substantial cooperation and remediation, may qualify for a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA). In these “near-miss” cases, the CEP contemplates an NPA with a term of less than three years, no independent compliance monitor, and a fine reduction of 50% to 75% off the low end of the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.

3. Part III – Prosecutorial Discretion for All Other Cases

In all other cases, prosecutors retain discretion to determine the appropriate resolution, including form, term, compliance obligations, and penalties. Fine reductions are capped at 50% off the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range.

The policy also directs prosecutors to assess cooperation in light of a company’s size, sophistication, and resources, potentially affording greater flexibility for smaller or less-resourced entities.

The new CEP preserves the familiar self-disclosure framework —  rooted in the Criminal Division’s policy dating back to 2016 and refined in May 2025⁴ — but now applies it uniformly across the Department. Although incentives for self-disclosure remain strong, companies now face a more standardized (but less predictable) regime. For companies considering whether to self-report misconduct, these decisions are now evaluated under a single set of rules. The importance of making those decisions quickly and with a full understanding of the incentives at play, is as important as ever.